

The process of history-making conflicts: subjectively revisiting
three historical conflicts in Process Work terms.

A final project for the Master of Arts in Conflict Facilitation
and Organizational Change

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ATHENS, 2007

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the members of my study committee, Lena Aslanidou, Dawn Menken and Lee Spark Jones for their invaluable guidance and support through this journey. Alexandra Vassiliou, Vassiliki Katrivanou, and Lily Vassiliou, for reading, commenting, and -mainly- putting up with me: words are not enough. And my fellow students of the 1st MACFOC cohort, I am grateful for the friendship and the conflict, the fun and the motivation, and mostly for all of you being there.

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The notion that conflict and war moves the world is a widely accepted one. It has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy, when Heraclitus stated that “war is the father of everything”. As much as it is disconcerting, it is true that in modern history, this being defined as the last 500 years approximately, major social and political transformations happened in what mostly was a non peaceful way. This paper has the purpose of studying three major conflicts, all of which are more or less completed or temporarily resolved by now, through the lens of process work. The reason for this is to try to apply process work in our understanding of history and mankind, since it is our past that our future depends upon. Process work offers the tools that can help us map those conflicts and the processes involved, and it can also give us an opportunity to find the reappearing patterns in human history. This paper is an initial attempt to fill a gap in the Process Work literature. It is intended for the Process Work learning community, interested in group processes and history, as well as the possible application of Process Work theory in broad historical contexts and international politics. For this intended audience, I presumed a level of familiarity with Process Work terminology, therefore avoiding further elaboration on the Process Work terms used. Hopefully, it will also provide a sense of continuity in history and some of the roots for the current international political scene; the later also was a personal reason for pursuing this particular topic as a final project.

The three conflicts that will be examined are the French Revolution, the Second World War and the Cold War. Their characteristics cover a wide spectrum of diversity. French Revolution was a conflict inside a nation, without being a civil war, and its repercussions spread first throughout Europe, and subsequently the rest of the western world. The Second World War was the first true global conflict, although it originated in Europe, and it pretty much defined the world as we –until very recently- knew it. In spite of being named a war, Cold War was not a declared war, but it created a dichotomous idea of good and evil, which is still implied in current conflicts. Without arguing that

conclusions drawn from these three conflicts could or should be generalized, these three conflicts offer a wide array of processes, different roles and diverse outcomes that are a fertile ground for process work ideas to be implemented, even retrospectively.

The rationale is that conflicts are living organisms that are born, develop, change, and die just to give their place in something new, like all living organisms do. Each conflict will be treated like a different case study, and through an unavoidably subjective point of view. Starting from the choice of events that will be described to the explanations given, all is purely subjective, as is all history and all explanations. The facts chosen to be presented here were a combination of my personal interpretation of their significance and their frequency of appearance in the literature. In many cases, this final project presented with the opportunity and the responsibility to rewrite history, in this very condensed and subjective form. At the same time, I experienced the difficulty of trying to narrate in a historical, academic manner events that triggered a deep emotional reaction. Writing this paper demanded, on many instances, innerwork, so that –at least- my bias would not become too obvious. It also challenged my long established point of view on many aspects of each conflict, and, at times, literally forced me to practice deep democracy.

In this paper, the main social and political background that led into, the major events during, and partially the outcomes of each conflict will be described. Facts for each conflict will be presented, and after each description the analysis in Process Work terms will follow (roles, ghost roles, dream figures, edges, and life myths), in a different type face, just so it can be easier to differentiate between the two. This will also be helpful in not having to repeat the facts for the sake of the analysis.

The French Revolution

The beginnings: Europe on the eve of the Revolution

While the French Revolution was not the first to benefit the middle class, it was the first to actively demand the equality of rights, overstepping the nobility and eventually changing the political system of a European country first to political and then to social democracy. In order to understand its origins –and its repercussions- we should first examine the world circumstances that preceded it. In the era preceding the French Revolution, most of the world was still outside Europe's sphere of influence. New lands were being discovered, but not yet conquered. In the meantime, the opportunity of expansion and the economical wealth that the new lands were promising was leading European nations to growing dissension among each other. Europe was not an entity anymore, but it consisted of different nations, with more or less specific borders, competitive rulers, and diverse religions.

The relation of the European nations with the rest of the world was that of commerce and exploitation of natural and human resources. In most occasions, Europe grew richer from the natural wealth of its colonies and through slavery. Only in 1787 in London and a year later in Paris, the “Society of Friends of the Negroes” was founded, as an expression of the growing moral and religious implications of slavery, and its aim was not the immediate disappearance of slavery, but its gradual abolition. In the mean time, Europe was importing goods and exporting its governing methods. In most cases –England with its constitution being the exception- this meant absolutism, religious intolerance, military and police rule, and bureaucracy. At the same time, the white residents born in colonies grew more and more impatient, hoping for self determination in governance and rules of trade (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The first seed of an upcoming change were evident. There were the inhabitants of the Continent that held all the social rank, the white inhabitants

of the colonies that felt marginalized. It is interesting here to note that the marginalization in the subgroup of the white Europeans was expressed in terms of social rank: those that were in the Continent enjoyed the privileges of civilization, while those that were born in the colonies were thought as inferior. At the same time, the marginalization and exploitation of the non white native inhabitants of the colonies was a subject that was shyly starting to appear in the process. Marginalization already seems to be a pattern, as in the rest of human history (Mindell, 1989, 1995.).

The French society

The French society was still defined by land ownership, a legacy of the era that land was the only source of wealth. Lords and aristocrats had sovereign authority over the peasants; the “Third Estate” as the peasants’ class was called in France. Therefore, it seemed that this Third Estate was condemned to a never-ending inferiority. Although class divisions were more than evident, the state had the power to give privileges certain to towns or provinces, even subgroups, investing in profitable “divide and conquer” governance. And it was during that time preceding the French Revolution that this societal hierarchy started being challenged by the appearance of mobile wealth from trade and the increasing importance of labor, intelligence, creativity and science, bringing in focus the bourgeoisie (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

There were four distinctively different classes or estates, the clergy, the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the peasantry. France had remained untouched by the Reformation and the clergy preserved all the wealth and the privileges as before. However, the clergy included both members of the nobility and commoners, both people of power, who took advantage of the wealth and lower clergy who protested about the mismanagement of Church revenue (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

Nobility was hereditary, as were the privileges it ensured. Aristocrats considered themselves as a different race, whose blood was to remain pure and

uncontaminated. Among the nobility were those who would become the ones bearing arms, diplomats, politicians, administrators, or members of the clergy, but menial work or commerce were derogative. Due to different reasons, the new economy that was based more on money than on land ownership being the main one, among the nobility appeared many discrepancies in terms of wealth and ways of living. A separate oligarchy that infiltrated the aristocracy ranks was formed by venality in office, meaning the right of a ruler to sell certain administrative, military, or financial positions adding nobility to certain offices. These new nobles eagerly adopted aristocratic manners and way of living (such as snobbery), but they also brought with them a new more bourgeois mentality. And, inevitably, the nobility started to feel threatened on two fronts: from the throne that had reduced its importance and from the upcoming bourgeois middle class (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The bourgeoisie was the richest part of the Third Estate. It was not a homogenous body, but it was based on peasants and artisans that managed with hard work to benefit from trade and commerce, often acting as middlemen. Money was the mean for social advancement and the main criterion that assured equal status among the bourgeois, even when personal achievements were taken into consideration. This part of the bourgeoisie entertained the same exclusiveness as the one that was detested in nobility and, although it had provided the thinkers that would define the Revolution, they were not spared. The petty bourgeoisie on the other hand, was referred to by the notables as the “people”, a term that was also used by the revolutionaries, but with different –positive- connotations. Their prosperity and their clientele was their measure of evaluation, and they –in turn- looked down on the proletarians. But the main schism was among those who had the moneyed power and those who had intellectual ability. And the latter, the “ambitious minority” as they were named later, were the ones that would provide the revolutionary leadership (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

In the bottom of this hierarchy lied the peasant, thought of as an ignorant being whose only purpose was to support the upper classes. Those few who owned land

had to pay heavy taxes to the king, the clergy and the lord who held the rights of the property. And at the same time, the peasants had the obligation to supply the town markets and were all obliged to manorial labor. As a result, the cumulative burden of taxes and obligations was unbearable. Although there was a minority that owned land, the vast majority of the agrarian population was landless, and confronted with insurmountable difficulties in supporting themselves and their families (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

These four estates are four distinctively different roles. The nobility carried all the social rank and privilege, while the bourgeoisie and the peasantry felt marginalized and denied of this privilege. The role of the church was divided between the two –as the church itself consisted of members of both classes. The competition between these three roles was evident and it was about social rank and the power that came with it. However, there also was the upcoming value of money, in addition with hereditary privilege. This was the rank that the bourgeoisie possessed, especially in comparison with the rest of the Third Estate. Furthermore, it was the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie that would assume the role of the spiritual leader during the revolution. And the Third Estate in itself is divided from the beginning, repeating the division of the society. It is interesting to see how all three roles felt threatened and on the defensive, all three unaware of their rank. For the nobility that rank was the hereditary privilege, for the bourgeoisie the acquisition of money. And for the rest of the Third Estate, it was that it outnumbered the rest that also depended on it. The latter would soon become obvious. When I was reading about this an image of a group process came to my mind. A room of 300 or so people, where all the space was monopolized by the 20 most privileged of them in terms of social rank, without consensus, and the rest 280 were growing restless (Mindell, 1995; Goodbread, 1997).

Throughout Europe charity and philanthropy was spreading with the patronizing background that poverty was the result of laziness and unworthiness. Those who had riches and privilege were considered to be the elect, the worthy, while to be

poor was a punishment. These ideas were also supported by the rise of capitalism. Beyond charity there was an absolute and complete lack of any social support system for the invalids, the aged and the poor that led to begging and brigandage; this in turn led to fear in the nobility and the bourgeoisie of individual crimes or collective revolt of the “populace”. The upper classes tried to soothe the poor by distributing food but their main concern was their own safety from a raging mob, which they feared that was on its way (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The rank of the Third Estate is starting to show. The Third Estate, however, is feeling totally marginalized and underprivileged, with no social power. Both roles, the privileged and the underprivileged (a rough generalization) are unaware of their power and rank. For the privileged, their power is so much a given that is hardly a matter of consideration, and the fear they are feeling in front of the Third Estate is the only sign that they are starting to realize their rank. For the underprivileged, the feeling that prevailed for a very long time was that of powerlessness and hopelessness that anything could change (if I dream into it). It was like a giant that felt too weak to do anything, but who was still terrifying to see (Mindell, 2002; Goodbread, 1997).

The background of this class system was a rapidly changing society. One of the effects of urbanization was the transformation of traditional relationships and conformities, thus creating circumstances that allowed more freedom –or at least the dreaming of freedom. The beginning of this change in thinking had its roots in science. Newton had already published his *Principia*, inducing a rational, scientific explanation of natural phenomena, and leaving behind magic. The mere thought that matter is subdued by natural laws that the human mind can uncover with observation and experiment created the grounds for everlasting change and advancement, in all fields of science and philosophy. The term “philosophes”, or philosophers, that are commonly used to describe the main thinkers of that era literally mean “those that love wisdom”. And it was exactly these philosophers that helped the mentality of their peers to change. Their work was deeply influenced from empiricism and pragmatism and it spanned all aspects of life.

The church with its privileges and decadence was their first target, and they attacked the censorship it was trying to impose on the circulation of the new ideas. They stood before an idea of natural religion; in Voltaire's words "if God did not exist, he would have to be invented". Their preoccupation with matters of ethics and freedom is evident in their writings, and they were almost the first to defend the Third Estate on issues such as taxes and were the first to coin ideas such as equality of rights –which referred not only to dignity, but also financial gain. However, they never doubted royal power and all their hopes laid with enlightened despotism. And although many of the philosophers were bourgeois, they shared with the aristocracy the wish for liberty, since the nobility interpreted it as the way to gain more political power and dominance in governing. The matter of equality of rights was to deeply divide them. And it was this notion that was so novel –as much we take it for granted now. In England, for example, where some form of constitution already existed, the governing classes believed that civil and political rights were to be distributed in respect with one's birth and/or acquired wealth. Any mention of equality seemed aggressive towards the existing status quo (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The philosophers were those that were bringing awareness and light. However, the role of the elder was still reserved for the king. The idea of equality was the high dream that dominated the philosophical thought. The low dream was the consensus reality that all were experiencing. Soon, the high dream of equality would also become the myth of the French Revolution (Mindell, 1989, 1995; Goodbread, 1997).

The true originality in the French Revolution lies in the demand of equality. This demand originated in the closed society that the aristocracy had formed trying to protect its privileges. Therefore, it seemed that the only way for the bourgeois to ascend politically and socially was to break down the doors that refused to open. As much as the bourgeois ascended with the power of money –since it was evident that birth alone could not secure a successful career- the more the aristocrats were trying to remain a closed, exclusive cast, with exclusive

privileges. The aristocrats accused royalty of displacing them and the bourgeoisie sought a place in the government –ruled then by the nobility. The eighteenth century was marked by the nobility's revival as much as by the bourgeoisie's ascend (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The conflict appears between the privileged with more social power and the privileged with less social power. These are two different parts of the same role, or two roles in the same sub-group. They are both privileged either by birth or by wealth. And these also were the ones with the rank to speak out, because their privilege allowed them the right to an opinion. The other role was the role of the truly underprivileged that was the Third Estate, the ones beneath the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The king appears in the role of the ruler, and he is dreamt up by all of the Estates to also be the elder, the one wise enough to rule them all. He could have also been a facilitator (Mindell, 1995, 2002; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

Another element of this era that set the stage for the French Revolution was the developing notion of the nation states that was leaving behind the dynastic states. France already had its first national heroine Jean d'Arc and a primitive sense of nationhood was there since the fourteenth century. The process towards nationhood was slow and lasted for many centuries, but on the eve of the revolution French (and English) could consider themselves as different from other people. The literary, philosophical and artistic rise of France in the eighteenth century, the dissemination of the French language throughout Europe and its civilization reinforced this feeling of nationality (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

Social rank in a broader context is again defined. France was the cultural leader of Europe, and the ability to discern one's self from the others (through nationhood), also gives the luxury to face one's own discordance (Diamond & Jones, 2005).

Across the Atlantic Ocean another revolution had just taken place: the American. Although the circumstances were different, the former colony had no tradition in

monarchy or in a House of Lords, as in their mother country, the American Revolution won over the hearts and the spirits of the European thinkers of the Enlightenment and it also gave an example of what could follow. In America after the revolution, the nobles lost all their rights, and wealth was the only remaining distinguishing mark among them. It has been argued that even the constitution undoubtedly was a matter of founding a nation, but also a matter of preserving the financial interests of the newly founded class, since voting rights and eligibility still depended upon property. Although the American Revolution was saluted by European thinkers in the beginning, some of its outcomes created much criticism (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The American Revolution set the stage for the deep changes that were about to happen in Europe. It helped to create the myth and the dream of the French Revolution and was also used as a third party, to support the bourgeoisie that still felt weak in front of the nobles (Mindell, 1989, 1992, 1995).

The Aristocratic Revolution (1787-1788)

A fact little known is that the first phase of the Revolution was led by the aristocracy. And the Revolution commenced on financial grounds. The Old Regime was found with a substantial deficit of 126 million livres (for reasons that do not concern this paper) but the steps proposed to resolve this financial crisis demanded some sacrifices that the aristocracy was not ready to make, such as the bourgeoisie taking part in government administration. The result was that the new taxation was never implemented and through a series of events and actions that were soon to be duplicated, the nobility had united and had formed resistance organizations, and finally had served the first blow against the royal power without giving up any of its privileges (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The revolution started from the privileged. The ghost role here was the one to be sacrificed, in economic terms, the one that would become poor. The nobility enjoyed the privilege to be able to be vociferous, a privilege that

went hand in hand with the rest. Its goal was to retain the existing status quo, but its secondary process did the exact opposite: it shook the status quo and undermined the royal authority. The nobility was the first to occupy the (ghost) role of the disturber, which, up to that point was assigned (more in a dreaming level than in consensus reality) to the Third Estate. The nobility became without any awareness the thing it feared most: the revolutionary and it set in motion the whole process. This lack of awareness around this created polarization between the two sides. The nobility could not find the power and the authority of the king in itself. If the aristocratic revolution was the first 5 minutes of a group process, the end is evident: the royal authority will be cancelled (Mindell, 1995, 2002; Goodbread, 1997; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

The Bourgeois Revolution (1788-1789)

Some members of the bourgeoisie had stood beside the nobility, trying to express their own discordance with the government and the king, while many others remained neutral. However, the news that the Estates-General was ready to convene, mainly because of the actions of the nobility, gave the bourgeoisie reasons to believe that the king himself was giving them permission to support their ideas. During these times, there still was an opportunity for the bourgeoisie and the nobility to come to an agreement, but the aristocrats would never consider it. On January of 1789 an unspoken war between the Third and the other two Estates was practically declared (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The motivating power is not coming from inside the Third Estate –the unprivileged role- but is projected on the elder (the king). The Third Estate still was not aware of its rank and it needed the real or dreamed of permission of the king. The nobility had the power to end the whole matter there, if it only took a step back. Instead, it escalated, refusing to recognize the point of view of the bourgeoisie. If the nobility needed support to stand firmly behind its demands, and to be reassured of its power, social role and rank, the king was

its obvious ally (as a third party). However, the king was absent (and weakened by the nobility itself), and the nobility felt threatened (Mindell, 1992; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

The National or Patriot Party was formed including both bourgeois and nobles. The financial crisis was still a huge problem, and the minister of finance reinforced the representation of the Third Estate in the Estates-General, in order to promote equality of taxation and subsequently strengthen the king's role in the conflict with the nobility. The nobility blocked the Estates-General, denying its power, and in January of 1789 a civil war was about to break out. Everyone was shouting words of hate to the aristocracy. The interesting point is that if the nobility had actually sided up with the bourgeoisie, it would have retained all the esteem it enjoyed, and after the confrontation with the king, it would have been idolized, as some of its members already were. Opposing the strong voices of individuals in the aristocracy, in the Estates-General, the Third Estate remained collective, mostly due to the lack of widely accepted representatives (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

If the nobility was aware of its rank, it would have stopped escalating and it would have kept its status. The nobility had become the ruler, the side that had shaken the king and had won this first confrontation. However, the nobility still felt threatened by the bourgeoisie and the king. So the opportunity to deescalate and ally with the bourgeoisie was lost. The National Party was the role that exceeded the others and included both. A third party, the bourgeoisie, was involved, but to support the other side, the side of the king. It is no wonder that the nobility felt threatened and stood firm, trying to keep its ground. The king and the bourgeoisie had formed an alliance against the nobility (Mindell, 1995; Audergon, 2005).

In the Estates-General, the conflict was between the king, the aristocracy, and the bourgeoisie. The demands of the people and the petty bourgeoisie were completely ignored. The king was trying to remain neutral (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The king was trying to be an elder, by remaining neutral but he was unaware of all parts, and therefore unable to take the role of the elder. Thinking about deep democracy, the people were not represented, and not even acknowledged. They remained in the field as a ghost role (Mindell, 1995; Goodbread, 1997).

In accordance with the spirit of the era, both the bourgeoisie and the nobility favoured monarchy, but not absolutism. Their demands included respect to the rule of law, freedom of press and personal liberties, ecclesiastical reorganization, end to the centralized administration, and religious tolerance. It is obvious that it was all about liberty (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The myth and the high dream of the revolution are starting to appear (Mindell, 1989, 1995).

The class conflict was expressed between the nobles that were ready to make financial sacrifices, but not give up governmental and administrative privileges, and the bourgeoisie that wanted nothing more than equality of rights. The king was the one that could assume the role of the elder, rise to the occasion and promote a settlement. However, Louis XIV failed, and the Revolution was ready to begin (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

It would be easy to criticize the king for not having risen to the occasion. However, the king himself had already been attacked recently by the nobility, and was probably polarized and biased. And the role of the elder was and is not to be occupied by one party alone. It could have been picked up by any of the other sides. The conflict at this point starts spreading; it is no longer on the systemic and consensus reality level (who will pay, who will have administrative positions), but also in the emotional and dreaming level (the demand for equality of rights transcends financial and administrative gains). Even if the systemic, consensus reality level was somehow settled, the dreaming level would still be around. And in this level there was a dream for a

better world where all had the possibility to claim their fullest potential, and all were equally important (Mindell, 1995; Goodbread, 1997).

The Estates-General in order to be presented to the king, was assigned a particular dress, different for each order. The difference was striking: the Third Estate wore black, while the aristocrats appeared in all their magnificence, decked and plumed. The king ordered each Estate to verify its powers, but the Third Estate declined, wanting to constitute itself as a separate order. It took the name Commons, refusing the hierarchy that had put it third in the rank. The clergy asked for royal intervention, that the nobility refused, and the signal for revolutionary action was then given (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The single act of different dresses was an immense escalation, since it made evident the inequality that the bourgeoisie wanted to change. It was also a way to remind everyone of their position in society, which was accepted no more by the Third Estate. This reminder was maybe the single hottest spot in the history of the revolution (Mindell, 1989 2002; Diamond, 2001).

The nobility's refusal led to its exclusion of the proceedings, and when the king finally interfered, it was to grant the Estates-General the power to consent to taxes and loans, and to guarantee personal and press liberties, but not equal taxation and admittance to public offices for all, retaining the traditional hierarchy. But, by that time there was a new demand for constitution, which Louis wasn't ready to succumb to. The equality the Third Estate was denied became synonymous with the revolution (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

As time was passing without any facilitation (the king seemed to be the designated facilitator, but he also was reluctant to accept the role, and double signaling around it), the demands augmented. The hot spot, a direct confrontation around social power and social status, that was not addressed came back hotter, and the intervention that some time before would have

settled everything now was too little too late. The constitution was the new high dream (Mindell, 1995; Goodbread, 1997).

A peaceful and successful revolution followed when the representatives of the Third Estate refused to separate into orders after the king's order, and this immobility disintegrated all resistance. The bourgeois revolution seemed to have succeeded. However, the king regarded the representatives of the Third Estate as rebels, and the nobility felt that surrender would be a humiliation. The army was getting ready to intervene, and all was set for the popular revolution that would follow (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The ghost roles of the underprivileged, the one being oppressed and the one that claimed a better place in the world still were not addressed and the humiliation of the loser would become revenge. The (fear of the) army was the third party called in to support the other two roles (the nobility and the king). If the king was able to recognize some, at least, fairness in what the bourgeois were demanding, that would have been a step closer to deep democracy, and it would have helped to resolve some of the tension. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie having been denied its rights for so long was unable to realize how great its power was. This time the bourgeoisie was the one unaware of its rank, and the one that took on the role of the revolutionary (Mindell, 1995; Audergon, 2005; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

The popular revolution

While the representatives of the three orders were engaged in the power struggle of the Estates-General, and long before that, the lower classes were faced with inhuman conditions. Beyond the taxes that were burdening them, a corps failure of the previous winter threatened for a fast approaching famine in the summer of 1789. The events of the Estates-General generated a hope for a better life, and a belief that the king was ready to hear their plights. So they declared that they would pay no more. Of course, the goals set by the bourgeoisie had little to do with them, and the hope came along with great passions and hatred towards the

privileged. The privileged bourgeois were not exempt (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The lower classes were the ghost role during the events of the Estates-General. They also were the most marginalized group, whose voice remained silent. They viewed the king as the one that would grant them voice and hope. As every marginalized group, when they found that their voice could be heard, they made lots of noise. To continue the image in my mind of the group process, that was the time that the restless 280 underprivileged people walked in and took over the center, pushing aside the 20 privileged people that had been working in the middle up until that point. It would seem as a high jacking of the group process, and at the same time it would be the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to speak out for this particular group.

The nobles on the other hand were ready to defend the existing status quo with any means necessary. Although it was not clearly expressed, the Third Estate believed that an aristocratic conspiracy was being plotted, that the nobles would call for foreign help. This wasn't exactly true, but the events could support such an interpretation. And the interpretation would at the end count more than the actual facts. This interpretation inspired a fear of the nobility, and combined with a punitive and sometimes revengeful feeling would eventually lead to the imprisonment of nobles, brutalities and massacres (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

It is obvious in retrospect that the revolutionary mentality was governed mainly by three elements: fear, defensive reaction and a punitive will. The fear would die out only after the uncontested triumph of the Revolution.

The conspiracy of the nobility was clearly expressed in their secondary signals and that is what the Third Estate dreamt into. Those secondary signals were the fleeing of aristocrats in other countries. The form that the dreamt up foreign help would take was, most probably, an army that would contain the lower classes. And, the lower classes became in their turn, what the nobility was dreaming into them: a revengeful, murderous crowd. It was also the time

for a long marginalized and unprivileged group to feel its power and take revenge. The double edge of both the privileged and the unprivileged role is obvious in the fear they both felt for each other and in admitting their own and each other's power. And no side could realize just how terrorizing it seemed. The ghost role of the one that is violent was already present (Mindell, 1992; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

This was the background that set in motion the events that led to the fall of the Bastille, the Parisian prison and now a symbol of the French Revolution. People feared the royal army outside Paris, and the panic created the need for arms. Bastille was the place to provide them. And although at that point it wasn't regarded as such, Bastille proved to be the turning point of the Revolution. After the fall, the king had no choice but to reassess the situation and give in (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The days after the fall of the Bastille were days of apprehensions and executions, with the support of the bourgeoisie. In the municipality of Paris was set up the first Revolutionary Committee. Robespierre was claiming that different governance was needed in times of war and revolution than in times of peace. That was to become the doctrine of the revolutionary government, with all its implications. Outside Paris the revolution was happening in a more peaceful way. It was evident though all over France that the king was not in charge anymore. In the rural areas, the effects of the events in Paris were strong. The most subtle form the revolution took was a passive resistance in matters of refusing to pay taxes, and the most extreme forms included the burning down of castles. The bourgeoisie wasn't always spared. There was a series of six localized but not so different incidents that gave rise to the Great Fear of the nobility, fear not only for their material possessions but also fear for their lives. They were right to be afraid since during that period aristocrats were being executed, and this same fear was what fueled the revolution of the peasants (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

This process was one of fear. All roles, all sides were afraid of the other, too afraid to see their own power. And this fear was stopping them from admitting the power the other side possessed and that this fear was justified. Centuries of oppression had led the lower classes to revolution and the aristocrats were starting to become aware of that. On the other hand, the lower classes were also aware of the power the nobility and the bourgeoisie possessed, but they had for the first time the opportunity to take revenge, to hurt those that had been hurting them for so long. And they were also afraid that the nobility (and the rich bourgeoisie) would strike back before long. If it was possible that this common fear could be expressed, the need for revenge would have de-escalated. The nobility for the first time was completely powerless, without the privilege that kept it safe for so long, and without the king to protect them. The elder was no more a role in the field than the king was a ruler in France. The mentality, the dreaming behind these events was clearly stated by Robespierre about the different governance in times of war and revolution and in times of peace. The role of the oppressor and the unjust was this time occupied by the revolutionaries (Mindell, 1995, 2002; Menken, 2002; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

In the meanwhile, the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen was the result of long discussions in the Assembly. And in their minds was that the popular revolution should be contained in a way that would not betray the liberal nobles and the members of the Clergy that had supported the Assembly from the beginning.

The final text of the Declaration proclaimed liberty, equality and national sovereignty. It was the official act of deicide for the Old Regime, and the executioner was the popular revolution. Although the king did not agree, it was clearly stated that the Declaration was constitutional and the constitution was “anterior to monarchy”. In this moment, the constitution ceased to be a mere contract and assumed the connotations it has in our days (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The text of the Declaration was the mythical background of the revolution and the high dream of the future. The constitution took the role of the king as the ruler of France. A final attempt to eldership was the consideration for those nobles and clerics that had supported the revolution (Goodbread, 1997).

Still, there was a lot to be settled. The king was trying to gain some time, and according to all evidence the aristocratic conspiracy was not fully suspended. After popular demand, the king decided to settle in Paris, and the feeling was that this period of unrest was coming to an end. The nobility, however, after the continuous successes of the Assembly had lost both privileges and wealth; the Third Estate had also suffered a friction, since the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat were now part of the Revolution and it was difficult to deny them access to the political life. The Assembly, and not the king, was now the ruler, only if its decisions were according to popular wishes. The Revolution was more successful than originally hoped for. The king was practically inexistent, and France was left without an official head of the state until 1793 (Lefebvre, 2001. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. Roberts, 2004).

The process had an unexpected turn. The high dream came truer than anyone could have imagined in the beginning. Suddenly, all had a saying in the governance of the state, not only the king, the nobles or the bourgeoisie, but also the people. The king had to die, symbolically and realistically, for its role to become part of the Assembly and all of the people, even though it remained unacknowledged. The role of the elder was still a ghost role. The new conflict that remained unaddressed was the conflict in the Third Estate, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This conflict, between the ones that had the power to grab the opportunity and the ones that did not, the ones with the privilege of wealth and the ones that were poor, would be suppressed for another century (Mindell, 1995; Goodbread, 1997; Audergon, 2005).

The French Constitution and the Myth of the Revolution

The primary process

There are three words that are synonymous with the French Revolution: equality, liberty, fraternity (égalité, liberté, fraternité). The idea of the equality was the most revolutionary and until then, unheard of. Greek philosophy and Christendom were behind these ideas in the European thought. The emphasis was given in the dignity of the individual and the value of the individual initiative. People were supposed to be protected by the Supreme Being. The power of the individual thought and effort, in order to overcome obstacles and tame the nature, in order to control the surroundings, those were the human characteristics most celebrated in both the Declaration and the Constitution. Man was finally starting to become his own god (Mindell, 1989, 1995, 2002; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

Equality was above everything else; “men are born and remain free and equal in rights”, as it was clearly and doubtlessly stated. For the first time in Europe, law was to be the same for all, regardless birth and privilege. And the state was for the first time assuming the role of the protector of individual rights. Even beyond this, the French Revolution set the example that resistance to oppression was legitimate. Finally, the Constitution balanced the power of the king with the power of the people (Lefebvre, 2001. Mindell, 1995).

The Declaration was the child of a victorious class, and its meaning was not subject to debate. The bourgeois and the revolutionaries that conceived it were certain that the order it supported was in accordance with natural law and the rational will of god. They were certain that it would assure humanity eternal well being. For the first time, the celebration of individual effort, intelligence, and enterprise included the competent of all classes, especially the lower. Everyone had an opportunity to prove themselves. The reform of the criminal procedures and the declaration of religious tolerance completed the puzzle of the deep changes the Revolution tried to make through the

Declaration and the Constitution. The myth was that if all were free and equal, peace would prevail, oppression and poverty would disappear. It was an almost utopian idea that lighted the fire in the hearts of many around the world (Goodebread, 1997).

The secondary process

However, side by side with these principles laid a pre-Darwinian principle that the competent (and the strong) could flourish, while the less able (the weak) would perish. Furthermore, equality may have been proclaimed, but it was not a given. Each individual had to gain it for themselves, and it still was an illusion for those that lacked the means to use it. And on the background, the antagonism and the conflict between the classes was still present. Another subject that neither the Declaration nor the Constitution managed a break through was slavery. It was stated that “man should enjoy liberty according to reason and with the guidance of virtue”, and this left open for interpretation who would and who would not be declared mature, and by whom. The constitution in the matters of slavery and slave trade favoured inaction, protecting the interests that the bourgeoisie had in the colonies, creating thus a ghost to still hunt Europe and the world. But also in France, civic liberties were not equal for all, since passive citizens and servants could not vote, because the criterion for participation in elections and for electivity was the amount of money paid in taxes. The number of those Frenchmen that were excluded reached three million citizens. The ghost role of the oppressor had not vanished, it simply had changed sides. The role of the marginalized was also present after the Revolution. This ghost role of superiority was the price of the victory that the Revolution had to pay: the part where the victor becomes also the conquered (Mindell, 2002; D. Menken, personal communication, May 3, 2007).

In retrospect, it seems that the aristocrats were the ones that set in motion the events that led to the Revolution, since it was they that asked the convocation of the Estates-General. The bourgeoisie began to act only after the meeting of the Estates-General, and the people were the last to rise. This alone is exemplary of how the privileged ones are to clear the road for the unprivileged groups to be heard. It did not happen on purpose, but it could not be avoided.

The success of the French Revolution that set a cautionary example for the rest of the Europe, and it caused a development contrary to what had happened on France. Fear of a popular revolution caused much fear in both the European nobility and bourgeoisie. It also proves that not all individuals, or groups, can follow a process at the same time. The French Revolution relieved all of Europe from a tension that may have not been expressed, but it certainly was felt, and this is the reason that attracted many foreigners in France during that time. The French Revolution embodied all that was secondary for the rest of Europe, and this explains the fear it caused (Mindell, 1992; Diamond & Jones, 2005; Audergon & Arye, 2006).

Aftereffects

The process of the revolution still was not completed. The ghost role of the fearsome one was still in the field, as was the revengeful one. The second revolution was again the result of the undying fear for the aristocratic conspiracy and foreign intervention. And this second revolution was again followed by the Terror, with trials and executions of nobles without any legal justification, absolute chaos and anarchy in the country. The king was the only one with the power to override the law, and this was a privilege now transferred to the people that (mis)used it indiscriminately. The oppressed people had become the oppressor they most feared and loathed. Revenge was the main feeling that ignored the event of the Declaration and the

Constitution that put law and equality above all. A natural end to the events of the French Revolution is the trial and execution of the king, after a failed attempt to escape. This regicide, the first to happen, was the ultimate message of equality: the king died as a common man. And the people had finally an opportunity to feel their power in all its magnitude. However, the king might have died, but the role of the king was never really processed. It was a matter of time before it would resurface (D. Menken, personal communication, May 3, 2007).

France tried to disseminate the ideas of the Revolution with war, claiming this way to secure other people's autonomy, without really consulting them. The saviors were also the occupying power in these countries. A huge debate started about the natural borders of France, marking the entrance to an era of state nations. Soon after, Napoleon Bonaparte would follow, becoming general, king and dictator, expressing the imperialistic ambitions of France, and bringing back the obviously not forgotten role of the king.

The heritage of the Revolution is a pattern that is still repeating all over the world. The French Revolution could be seen as the first of a series of group processes around equality of rights and liberty, the one that sorted the matters to be processed. And its power lied that it was the first field to give voice to the unprivileged. Far from resolving matters for good, it created a high dream to be shared by all humanity (Mindell, 1995, 2002; Menken, 2002; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

World War II

An overview of the dawn of the century

The beginning of the 20th century was the apotheosis of the nation state. The sense of nationhood was prominent in all countries. Different languages were used to differentiate among people, and during this time patriotic myths were created and spread. Nationalism was a force of social cohesion, and also a disruption in old empires. The nation was celebrated in the anniversaries of old military victories. And at the same time, while the French Revolution was fighting for liberty and equality, at this time freedom meant liberal capitalism, the economical model in the western world that also implied freedom of speech, of commerce, of science and democratic governance. As Karl Marx had already predicted, the accumulation of financial resources and their subsequent investment in industry and communication had led to this model (Howard, 2002a).

There were strong opposing poles competing in this era. The society and the economy were transforming from agricultural to urban, the social hierarchy was becoming a democracy, religion developed into a private matter and the states were increasingly secular. The time of the self sufficient communities was almost over and the first indications of a global economy appeared. The schism was more evident between those that welcomed the dawn of a new age and those that feared the loss of traditional values, and the privilege they assured. Even the urban classes were no longer a revolutionary menace, but votes to be won, and the urban lifestyle had become more and more attractive and supported by state policies (Howard, 2002a. Nye, 2005).

Should we consider the beginning of the century, it is evident that there are two roles competing; the one that sees hope in the future and the one that dreads it. It is a time of change, and this change is also symbolic, a new century always symbolizes a new era. The conflict of these polarities that would lead was waiting to happen.

Advances in science changed fundamentally human perception of the world and the self, as the work of Max Planck, Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud became popular. The industrial western societies became gradually more and more dependent on oil, which was produced in a few other countries. And with the colonialism for financial gain, there was also the responsibility of the white race to educate, spread the civilization and the Christian religion. This rapid progress was soon to become conflict, something that both Karl Marx and Charles Darwin had foreseen. The principle of the survival of the fittest would soon be tested again with another war, to determine which the fittest nations to survive it were, and Darwin's ideas were soon to be distorted in Hitler's ideology, that the extinction of an unfit species could be justified (Howard, 2002a. Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999).

Darwin's theory, as it was interpreted, was a hot spot in itself. The idea of the fittest creates immediately the ghost role of the unfit and the ghost role of one that can decide, who falls in each category. Europe obviously was privileged compared to the rest of the world, but inside Europe there were discrepancies in privilege that were hard to ignore (Mindell, 1989, 1995).

In terms of science, the beginning of the 20th century found people believing that little more than tying loose ends was still to be done. However, right at 1900 this changed and Max Planck presented his quantum theory. Five years after, Albert Einstein wrote his paper on Special Relativity and changed the world in human minds for ever, bringing to light new dimensions and ideas that could not be understood with reason and observation. However, an important element in science was and is still missing: the sense of how it all fits together, a unified theory of everything. The relativistic science also erroneously inferred a notion of moral relativism that right and wrong were not absolute but they depended on each individual's perspective and origins that was not justified by the scientific theory. Freud's theory of the unconscious was interpreted in the same way. Furthermore, the quantum mechanics and Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty (that is that we can not know both the velocity and the position of electrons in orbit around the atom's nucleus) inspired a philosophical and intellectual idea of

a physical world that could not be rationally explained. Subjectivity and uncertainty were introduced back in the human thinking by the exact thing that had threatened to expel them: science. The advances in science and especially physics eventually led to the creation of nuclear weapons and the destruction they caused in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which still influences attitudes about science and scientific research (Howard, 2002a; Weinberg, 2002; Roberts, 2004).

At the same time art was also changing and adapting to the new media. Cinematography was an unparalleled revolution with an enormous impact and it was quickly used to promote ideas. Leni Riefenstahl's work is, for example, an artistic triumph that still causes embarrassment since it glorified the ideals of Nazis' Germany. Rationality was impeded by films, since to be rational is to be able to stand back and be objective, but the power of films is exactly the opposite; it is the immersion in an imaginary world with real emotional reactions (Lynton, 2002).

The moral relativism and subjectivity that dominated philosophy at that era created a grey area, where the roles of right and wrong were dubious. Science occupied perfectly this same role, becoming the savior and the destructor at the same time. And there would be an effort to go back in the comfortable poles of black and white (during the Second World War), but the morally questionable practices would be used by both sides. This similarity of both sides may now be evident, but at the time even the idea was unacceptable. Moral relativism remained a very powerful ghost role (Mindell, 1992; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

One of the causes of the Second World War was the economical consequences of the First World War. During the inter war years, governments gradually started to control more of the economy, which resulted to a disruption of the balance between the United States and Europe and Europe and its dependent peripheries. This led to the Great Depression and the division of the world to semi autonomous economies, providing the context for the beginning of the Second

World War. The mere idea of governmental control over the economy influenced and changed both Left and Right ideas. Lenin incorporated it into the Soviet model, and Mussolini in Italy left private ownership intact, but imposed state control over it, led by the idea that the nation is far more strong than class, and that totalitarian control is possible; the same idea and Mussolini himself inspired the rise of Franco in Spain, Peron in Argentina, and Hitler in Germany (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999; Nye, 2005).

It seems ironic that, as the French Revolution was triggered (but not caused) by economical reasons, the same is happening with the Second World War. The government was the ultimate ruler of economy and, subsequently, of privilege. And both totalitarian regimes of the 20th century shared the same starting point. Also, the simultaneous rise of fascist regimes in different parts of the world is indicative that it covered some need of the people for a strong nation that would care for and protect them. Also, it is to be kept in mind that the wave of urbanization brought with it the anonymity and the insecurity of a new environment. The nation was assuming the role of the protector, at any cost.

After the First World War the winners had to pay back huge debts to the United States. Therefore impossible reimbursements were asked of Germany and Austria-Hungary, also because the winners wanted to ensure that both these countries would be unable to cause another war. Inflation hit both countries and famine and financial destruction followed. Capitalism became notorious, and after war peace started with the absolute worse omens (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Skidelsky, 2002).

The financial crisis affected all of Europe, in different measures of course. The result was that European countries had come out of the First World War bruised, financially and demographically, and dependent on the United States. On the other hand, the United States and Japan were –each for different reasons– steadily gaining more financial strength. However, the United States was far from ready to accept the role of the financial leader of the world, and it was pretty self

sufficient too. So, when the United States cut down on lending and imports at the same time (between 1928 and 1930), the world economy collapsed. The results of the Great Depression was unemployment (as high as 22% in the United States and 17% in Germany), and a steep decrease of the income. The financial destruction left no country untouched, not even the USSR (Skidelsky, 2002).

One of the most interesting parts of the Second World War was the role of the United States. It was gradually considered the designated leader, financially and militarily, but it was reluctant to accept it. The isolationism that defined American foreign policy for almost the first half of the century transformed it into a ghost role, that would (and did) appear as the moderating third party. The United States was absent at that point from European political life, but it was not ignored.

Countries turned into establishing (once again) a more self sufficient economy. Fascist economies were the fastest to start recovering; in Germany, for example, Hitler managed to restore full employment in three years. One result of the successful autarky financial policies was the need to incorporate lands, when the countries felt too narrowed to survive. Japan occupied Manchuria, Italy attacked Abyssinia and Germany invaded Poland, after already having occupied peacefully Austria and Czechoslovakia. The autarky experiment obviously had its drawbacks and world leaders were now convinced that liberal economic order should be rebuild on improved policies and institutions (Louis, 2002).

Nationalism should be expected to go together with autarky and imperialism in order to secure what was needed for survival. Germany was rapidly changing roles and resuming its previous rank in Europe, but it was too traumatized from the First World War to become aware of it. It was becoming the oppressor and it had resumed the strength necessary to occupy this role (Mindell, 2002).

After the end of the First World War, the world landscape had changed. The empires that had dominated for 200 years were devastated and the victors – Britain, France, and the United States- were to rule the continent. In 1919, the

European order was about to be restructured. The United States wanted self determination and collective security; the latter was expressed with the formation of the League of Nations. The French and the British however, were concerned with a possible revival of Germany. Finally, for many of the Allied leaders of the West, an urgent priority also was the containment of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The long awaited constitution of Poland as a separate state caused a serious grievance both for defeated Germany and Russia, who both sought to reverse it with the first opportunity. For Germany, the territorial loss was not the only problem. The German government found itself in an impossible position, having to sign a peace treaty that they resented, and having to deal with the communists and the right wing. What is even more, in the Versailles treaty there was for the first time a “war guilt” clause that meant that Germany was not only responsible, but also culpable for the war. It was the clause used to justify the enormous amount asked for reparations, but it also infuriated the German conscience (Howard, 2002a. Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999).

It seemed that winners of the First World War asked for revenge, or at least imposed an extremely harsh punishment upon the defeated. This alone was enough to create the roles of the oppressor and the oppressed. The economical crisis would leave no country untouched, but it was as difficult as always for any country and any nation to become the elder. Additionally, the “war guilt” clause put an emotional burden onto Germany, mostly unjustified. The League of Nations was to take the role of the elder, or even the essence that could contain all, but this proved an impossible task. The rise of Communism led to reemergence of the revolutionary role, the one that threatened the existing status quo (it could also be labeled as the terrorist role) (Mindell, 1995; Audergon, 2005).

At the same time, the function and the integrity of the League of Nations were already compromised since the United States, Russia and Germany were excluded. This would only change 10 years after the end of the First World War. The temporary peace that was established at that time was put in danger by the financial crisis that came. And it was this financial crisis that suddenly made both

Communism and right wing movements to appear very attractive to different classes for different reasons. The intellectuals and the working classes were turning towards Communism, while the bourgeoisie and the possessing classes were more sympathetic to right wing movements, named fascist after their Italian progenitor. Although Mussolini and his fascist regime in Italy little disturbed Italian society, its German counterpart the Nationalist Socialist German's Working Party drew enormous power, due to the insisting resentment of the Versailles treaty and mostly because of its charismatic leader Adolph Hitler (Nye, 2005).

The rise of nationalism in Germany had its roots also to a reaction to French hegemony and a need to establish a national identity. The rising of national identities all over Europe did not distinguish it, until different became also superior for Germans. The notions of *Reich* and *Volk* imply the racial dominion that Nazis later acclaimed. The racialist ideology, like anti-Semitism, was not manufactured by Nazism, but Nazism simply revived it. Racialism soon expanded to imperialism and they gave birth to Nazism, which embodied the absolute worst in Germany and in Europe. Fascism in all its forms was the exact opposite of the values expressed by the French Revolution, and it also was a new expression of conservatism and authoritarianism. On the other end, Communism sharpened and continued the class conflict that had begun with the French Revolution (Howard, 2002b. Roberts, 2004).

The reasons that explain why the best field for the rise of Nazism was Germany have been explained. It was the country that had suffered most both financially and emotionally by the strict Versailles treaty. Therefore, their power and their ability to be powerful was a ghost role, a secondary process, until Hitler brought it in the surface. For Germans to feel their power they needed someone to exercise it on; Jews had been Europe's scapegoat for many centuries. On the same time, the rise of Communism embodied the role of the oppressed that was taking charge of his/her fate and power, in a different way. Nazism and Communism were two extremes of the same

continuum, not so different in their essence (Mindell, 1989, 1995; Menken, 2002).

Personalities and events

Hitler managed to manipulate those who wanted to take advantage of his rhetorical assets and ascend to power. He had an uncanny ability to set up almost theatrical surroundings for his speeches, and what was more, he exhibited results in a period that Germany needed them desperately. He managed to provide economical stability and to restore Germany's influence and self respect. His goal was clearly expressed in a book under the title "Lebensraum" (living space) that envisioned a greater international economy, devoted to Germany's national purposes. The idea of a united Europe was not a novel one, and it has been realizing the last 50 years, but the differentiating element of Hitler's vision was that it would only serve one people. This living space could not be obtained without war, a war neither Hitler nor Germany disapproved of. That alone makes Germany's responsibility –and culpability- for the Second World War far greater (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999).

The history of the Second World War could be a sum of biographies. Hitler was one man that personified all the evil. But, he also was nothing more than a creation of the time he lived, and he also personified –in that particular period- everything that a whole nation needed. He managed to assume the leader's role and to reinstitute self confidence in every German. His personality defined Germany's course of action, and maybe even the outcome of the war. The same also applies to Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, who also assumed the role of the hero for their respective countries. The role of the hero had for the allies had more or less the same characteristics for each country, all of the leaders were men who overcame their difficulties and rose to the circumstances, inspiring hope in times of great difficulty in entire nations. One could say that this personification of each role (assuming that Germany, Britain, the United States, and the USSR were expressing roles in

the field, where the United States was the hero that would save the day, Britain was the crumbling but resilient giant, the USSR the champion for people, and Germany the designated villain), is the ultimate expression of the century's secondary process: what started as a century devoted to nations and nationhood, evolved to a century that moved around and because of charismatic personalities. The nation was what nationalism was preaching as of utter importance, but the nation was motivated by one man. This might actually be the characteristic of the congruency (and one sidedness) that each role had, and one person could fully express it. Of course, this is not to imply that all Germans agreed with Hitler (as not all Americans agreed with Roosevelt). After all, the example of Churchill, whose contribution in the Second World War was fully recognized, but yet failed to be reelected, is typical. The Second World War had created the circumstances for each role to be expressed by one person, almost incongruently to its relativistic background. The absolute black and white, the clear limits of each role might have been the expression of a secondary process, contrary to the primary morally relativistic attitude. The primary process was one of relativism and transition as it had been set at the dawn of the century, while the secondary process was one of absolutism and set rules. And also, the role of the German, of the one that is trying to gain back and feel his power was bigger than Hitler, and Hitler was more than this role, and this applied to all leaders and all roles. Still, the Second World War is one of these historical events that the different roles are remembered by simply the names of their leaders (Mindell, 1992, 1995; Goodbread, 1997; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

Soon enough, a new axis between Germany and Italy was forming, but few leaders realized that Hitler's objective to reassert Germany as a world power, more imposing than it had ever been –although he had clearly stated his intent in his book. The German regime had many sympathizers in the rest of Europe since it was the only leverage to Communism, which still appeared more threatening. Meanwhile the League of Nations kept being discredited failing to intervene when

Japan seized Manchuria or when Italy invaded Abyssinia, and especially in the Spanish civil war. Hitler left the League, began a program of rearmament and in the next two years (1936-1938), he peacefully invaded Austria and claimed part of Czechoslovakia (Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003 Nye, 2005).

The building of alliances shows that one country alone was not enough to fill the role of the aggressor, and it was also in need of support. It was a time of peace, a time that Europe was trying to recover from the consequences of the First World War. Another aggressor in the field was not welcome. In the meanwhile, the failure of the League of Nations proved its own deficits in assuming the role of the elder, or at least the role of the stabilizer.

In the rest of Europe, especially Britain, there was an impression that Hitler would stop, if his demands on Czechoslovakia were satisfied, mostly because everyone saw another war approaching and was ready to do anything to avoid it. Furthermore, after the First World War, British statesmen wanted to help Germany regain its position among European states, since for most of the time the two countries had no quarrel. And even more, European leaders could not believe that the extremities that Hitler proclaimed, he also meant them. For some of them, he was a crusader against Bolshevism, others like a nationalist leader claiming what was right for his country. What is even worse, Hitler just did what all of Europe was doing; he put different people in different categories and treated them differently. It was nothing different from the imperialist behavior towards Blacks, the difference was in degree and not in kind, and that made it easy to dismiss. When it became obvious what this difference meant, that it was actually a difference in kind, nothing like ever done before, it was already too late (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Roberts, 2004).

The inability of the rest of Europe to react on time shows how difficult it is to be fluid. Germany was –and in European thinking remained- in the role of the loser of the First World War. To become aware of its power meant to become aware of the actions that should be taken, and the inability to keep the opponent in the defensive; this would imply to change one's view of one's

self. While the rest of Europe remained fixed in the same role, at an edge to change its attitude, Germany was moving. One of the reasons of this lack of fluidity was that Hitler did not push the rest of Europe on its edge (that was the breach of the principles of equality and freedom). Had he chosen an extreme position from the start, Europe would have been forced to move (Mindell, 1995; Audergon, 2005).

The causes of war are envy, greed and the like deadly sins, as it has been very eloquently said. And there are also attitudes that did not prevent it. Just before the outset of the war (marked by Hitler's invasion to Poland), almost all of Europe had resigned to the inevitability of another war. This feeling of inevitability made all arguments for the opposite pointless. Another reason, one more embarrassing to admit, is that war had come in fashion. Nationalism cultivated the propaganda, and propaganda cultivated a popular demand for war. And this popular demand enabled the governments to conduct the war with unprecedented violence. The Second World War posed the question if a limit to cruelty actually exists, or if it constantly recedes, since in its course all the *jus in bello* (the code of conduct in wartime) simply vanished (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Howard, 2002b).

There was a role that permitted everything in this war to happen, that there was no right or wrong. Probably this role was that moralistic relativity, a sense of irrational inevitability, a sense that human reason was not enough to explain anything. A dark instinctive part of humans had been unveiled (or invented) by Freud's theory of the unconscious. It was a role of something inhuman, that knew only its needs and had no consideration for the other. Just by talking about it, it had become more real than ever, and it was expressed in every role.

To classify this war as Hitler's war is too oversimplify all the processes that led to it. One man alone cannot initiate a World War; the Second World War was also the merging together of many distinctive wars in different places. Of course, Hitler's personality played an important role in the events that led to the war.

Historians argue that his attitude on the nature of human relationships being a constant conflict, and his own justification for him to use any means in this conflict, together with his being a mass murderer could not but promote the war (Nye, 2005).

Another distinct characteristic of Hitler's personality is seen in the organization of the National Party and later in the way he was governing Germany. To put it simply, the only thing that mattered was devotion his lieutenants showed too him, the Fuehrer. And the Fuehrer was the hero, a hero that defied logic and uses force and authority to prevail, and does not to be elected, to be the reasonable choice of the people, he is simply recognized as such (the archetype of hero). The obedience to the leader, the Fuehrer, the hero is based on emotion and not on reason. And Hitler was a master of emotional manipulation, staging his public appearances in a way that made his speeches hypnotically effective. His authority was unquestioned; he was infallible (just like the Pope). Hitler did not care to have a well organized government, not even one with common ideological background, since even ideology could come to a clash with his authority. The result was that lack of solidarity, mistrust and malice were inherently built to the system from the beginning. The same devotion was inspired to the civilians, and that made the propagation and acceptance of preposterous ideas possible; the feeling was blinding the reason, hardly an excuse but nonetheless true. Hitler also used fear to control the country, and murder to eliminate the opposition. Everything was under Nazi censorship, schools, books, plays, broadcasting. The judicial system was reduced to a travesty, and the mere knowledge of the existence of the concentration camps was enough to quell all opposition. This extreme form of dictatorship and murder was well known in Germany, and in some extent, in the rest of Europe, but it took a war to end it (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Nye, 2005).

Hitler is an archetypical role of a leader and a hero (as well as of the evil incarnate). He occupied this role so fully that there hardly was any room left for the rest of his government to be in it. His leadership however was not a uniting force that could be held under scrutiny, but it was based in emotions

and mainly the emotion of fear. He managed to erase all reason by eliminating the option any other role for the German people. And in the same time, he offered such rank that was blinding. By creating technical divides between the Aryans and the rest of the humans, he made fluidity impossible (and punished by death). The absolute control of information blocked out all third parties, all the other roles. The use of the visual (and not the auditory) channel during his speeches gave him control over the emotion. If the role of the weak and the unworthy had remained a ghost role, some part of the Germans would eventually take it; but, by acknowledging it and assigning it, he sealed each one in their role. The attempts on his life though show that it was a matter of time before the roles were reversed. This was a tactical mistake, because no one role can remain silent for ever, and if the primary process was the one dictating complete devotion and obeisance, the secondary process would be an untamed and irreverent troublemaker. And the secondary process was the one that asked for the right to its own opinion and decisions; the one that could be what Hitler called weak or inferior (Mindell, 1989, 1995; Goodbread, 1997).

However, when Hitler occupied all of Czechoslovakia it was evident that another war was ante portas. Hitler was ready to invade Poland, whose interests could only be protected by Britain and the USSR together. However, Stalin chose to sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler, judging that the USSR was not ready for war, and in spite of the natural revulsion of Communism against fascism. As it has been said, once again *raison d'état* (the interest of the state) proved stronger than ideology. Hitler eventually invaded Poland and the Soviets moved in soon afterwards to claim what was left. The Germans sealed the Jewish ghettos and they both managed to eliminate all potential leaders and intellectuals. The Baltic States were next, and Finnish territory was finally secured for the Soviets, after a fierce resistance. Hitler attacked and invaded on his turn Norway and Denmark and then France and the Low Countries. The British were now alone, besieged on their island, but still determined to continue the war. And they had a leader charismatic enough to counterbalance Hitler: Winston Churchill. In the

meantime, the German-Italian axis moved to the south, occupying Yugoslavia, Greece, and Libya, and humiliating the British in the process. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary accepted German hegemony, sharing Hitler's anti-Semitism and totalitarian views. And where resistance grew, unfortunately it would turn into a civil war (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999).

The USSR, with its changing alliances, was the most fluid of all the parts in the Second World War. The pact it signed with Hitler was not inexplicable, but served exactly the same purposes for both. The USSR also wanted part of Poland, and for a brief time it occupied with Germany the roles of the aggressor and the oppressor. Despite the ideological differences in the consensus reality, there were many similarities in the dreaming level (such as the need to provide for and gain the most for one's country). The role of the defender was also incubated by Britain (and Churchill was the appropriate man to lead it), and Britain was also the one with all the spiritual rank, surviving the incessant bombings and retaining high morality in spite of the adversity (Goodbread, 1997; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

What changed the course of the war that almost predefined Germany's triumph was Hitler's decision to invade the USSR in the summer of 1941. This proved to be a determining moment of the war, and the reasons behind this decision are still a matter of debate. It seems though that what weighted most was the need to ensure the natural resources of the USSR (still if not an outright ally, at least neutral for Germany at that point) independently of Stalin's goodwill. On the other hand, the USSR could have swung too the Allies much earlier, given Hitler's despise of Bolsheviks, Russians and Jews, and his wish to invade Russia and make it Germany's province. Stalin himself had supported anti-fascist movements, for example in the Spanish civil war. Europe was shocked by the pact he made with Hitler, mostly because of the promised partition of Poland and Eastern Europe. In the meanwhile, Stalin chose to ignore all the evidence for the forthcoming German invasion in the USSR out of fear that they were wrong (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Howard, 2002b. Roberts, 2004).

The conflict in the sub-group arose. Hitler and Stalin had been occupying the same role, and this role was about conquest and greed. In the background, there also was the ghost of ideology, and the ghost of hatred.

The German army reached the outskirts of Moscow and had surrounded Leningrad by the December of the same year. And then two interlinked events changed everything. The first was the Russian counter attack. Stalin had already kept back in Far East an entire Army Group to protect Russian interests from Japan. Once it was clear that Japan's main target was the American naval fleet in the Pacific, Stalin employed these troops against Germany that proved to be unprepared for a prolonged war. It was the popular will and patriotism that made possible the inversion of the war and the continuous resistance, with little ideological content, a fact that has been understated in official Soviet history (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Roberts, 2004).

There was a myth in the comeback of the Russian Army, the myth of an unyielding Russia. It was a national myth of a country that had never surrendered to an external conqueror. The Red Army and the Russian resistance were not motivated by the loyalty to the Soviet regime, or Stalin himself, they were motivated by the inherent myths of Russian culture that implied that Mother Russia was there to protect them all. Russian obedience to one leader (something that became evident with Czar Peter the Great) was a necessity because of its vastness and diversity; a strong force was needed to keep Russia together. But it was Russia itself, the country that provided for everyone.

It is quite interesting to notice that Hitler's demise was to begin in a country led by a man much like himself. Stalin employed many of the same tactics as Hitler did to assure his undisputed leadership. After all, they both were revolutionaries –even current politics had failed to observe the revolutionary force of fascism, and their regimes shared many common aspects. To name but a few, terror, cultic leadership, propaganda, a veiled-by-the-myth-of-popular-power totalitarianism, and the ruthless extermination of any

opposition and all enemies of the state, true or fictional (in the first days of the war thousands of the political opposition prisoners were executed). Of course the ideological differences between the two regimes were self evident; Communism was standing for internationalism, atheism, social leveling, and class hatred instead of racism (racism was there, of course, but as a secondary process). And this is the other myth, the myth of Communism. Despite the similarities the two regimes shared on the surface, the myth of their creation was completely different. Both used the same weapons, but for a completely different purpose. While Nazism was trying to eradicate nations and create a social hierarchy based on race, Communism was aiming to eradicate social hierarchy and discrepancies (at least that was the primary process; in effect, it created a new hierarchy based on political power) (Mindell, 1995; Audergon, 2005; Menken, 2002).

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that same December was what motivated the United States to enter the war. Up until that point, neither ideological antithesis to Nazism, nor Churchill's rhetoric was enough. Still the American people did decide to enter the war when Hitler declared war to the United States leaving them with no other option. The involvement of the United States in the First World War broke a long tradition of isolation, and it was the final test of modernity to pass. Most Americans stood for neutrality and considered aloofness the best policy, especially when European conflict was concerned. And it was this experience that made them even more reluctant to intervene yet in another war. Roosevelt's new deal, the promise of relief, recovery and reform, managed to reconstruct American society and government and to provide more civil rights to all citizens. The citizens of the United States experienced themselves as deeply democratic, able to solve everything with more democracy. And at the same time, Roosevelt managed to reorganize the American military strength by 1939. When Japan attacked the American fleet in the Pacific, it automatically solved a controversy between isolationists and internationalists. And the American entry to the Second World War was determining not only for the course of the war, but

also for the resurrection of the country (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Irye, 2002)

The Japanese attack on the United States was the introduction of two third parties. While Japan acted in a way that supported Germany, the implication of the United States changed completely the balance. The United States was a reluctant third party, but it was dragged in the conflict. Japan had a dream of conquering the Pacific and establishing its power, while the United States' dreaming was that of the reluctant superhero implicated in someone else's war in order to protect its own (and after the war the superhero would become a superpower). The whole Pacific War was like a parallel process that influenced the field of Europe. It was not a conflict between subgroups; it was the same conflict in another field. It felt like the whole world was needed to contain this process.

From the Japanese point of view, the choice of the United States and not the USSR as a target was a rational one. The United States had already exhibited interest in the Pacific (China was the first country that the United States had considered as promising in terms of trade and influence). Japan had also displayed its imperialist policy, which was more curious for the rest of Asia than American or European imperialism. Japan eventually started acting in Asia unilaterally, ignoring signed treaties, causing worries and reactions both in Europe and the United States. Japan's aggression was not caused by disenchantment for the country's status (as in Germany), but because of the rise to power of leaders that despised internationalism and capitalist liberalism (as in Germany). And there also was a dream of a new order in Asia that would not include American or European influence. The beginning of the Second World War incited the abandoning the pretenses of cooperation and put in the foreground the Japanese interests, and it was these interests that had divided Asia. The Asian war merged into the European war with the attack on Pearl Harbor. The reasons for this attack seem to escape geopolitical calculations or rational logic (Japan was already fighting a war with China that was not successful), and only a belief about Japan's superiority as well as a lot of wishful

thinking seem to explain this decision. Japan's rhetoric named the war as the Great East Asian War, trying to prove that it was fighting for Asian liberation of western power, but the rest of the Asian countries remained unconvinced (Irye, 2002. Nye, 2005).

Japan was another role in the field, the one that is ready to sacrifice itself. The myth behind Japanese strategy, as it has survived until today in the Western world, is one of kamikazes that put the country's interests above their own lives. The other part of the myth is a code of honor. The conflict was getting wider and was escalating. However, the personal element was still there, in emperor's Hirohito presence that would prove fatal.

However, the actual turn in the war didn't come until autumn of the following year, when the United States managed to throw its weight and also when in February of 1943 an entire German Army surrendered in Stalingrad. The Allied forces were also involved in the Mediterranean and finally the British military self respect started being restored. When in June 1944 the Allies invaded Normandy, it was a matter of time before the collapse of Germany. Less than a year later Hitler would commit suicide in Berlin and the Allies would crown their undoubted victory with the nuclear attacks against Japan. Ironically, this could have been avoided if Japan had surrendered earlier, but the emperor hesitated, fearing military reactions and institutional changes (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Irye, 2002. Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003).

The death of the leader and the hero (as a role) was the final curtain for the Second World War. If Hitler had survived, he would lose his mythical status. His role, the omnipotent leader, the one that could show the way for a nation and for the world, had come to an end. The role of the leader creates also the one who is being led and the one that does not want to be led. Hitler managed to crush all disobedience with brute force, thus becoming absolutely one sided. Fear was the secondary process, fear of weakness and impotence. All opposition and all weakness had to be exterminated, since it was so dangerous. With Hitler's death, the role was left unoccupied and someone

else had to take it up; this someone was the United States. The use of the nuclear bombs against Japan was a show off of power. The war had ended and it was a matter of time before Japan's surrender. The nuclear bomb is also a role, the role of total destruction and death, a destruction far more complete than anything envisioned until then. It could have been a desperate measure to end the war, or it could have been an ignorant decision. Whatever may be true, but the result was that the nuclear bomb changed the process of war forever (Mindell, 1995, 2002; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

In all wars there are distinct rules of engagement such as fighting on certain days, women and children, ambassadors and clergy are not to be harmed and proportionate retaliation. The Second World War broke all of these rules, and the most shocking expression was the Holocaust. Maybe Hitler actually believed in the beginning that the Jews were the cause of all evil, but he soon enough generalized the idea of Jews to include all his adversaries. He also may have known the political power of prejudice, but there is no evidence to support that he merely used to it as a means to control the people. There are arguments that Hitler thought of slaughter as merely necessary, therefore it was not a moral issue, and maybe not even agreeable or disagreeable. As for the people that were in between Aryans and Jews (such as the Slavs), they were destined to be servants, treated "like redskins" in Hitler's words. Anti-Semitism was not invented by Hitler; Germans had already resented all who refused assimilation to the German culture and insisted on being different. Hitler stopped asking for assimilation and insisted that Jews would never become Germans. The Star of David that was used to mark all Jews was to be a constant reminder of that. The Jews were an easy target, since they were a distinctively different population within the state, and without a state of their own. Furthermore, their usefulness in providing money had eclipsed, but their power thought intact. And of course, they were an example of a self-chosen race, a title that the Germans demanded for themselves. What is even more important, and not often admitted, is that Hitler managed first to prove that Jews were unwanted in other countries too; the United States congress denied the entry of 20,000 Jewish children in the

country, and the British only allowed them in Palestine in small numbers (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Howard, 2002b.).

Jews were not the only group that was targeted in that era. Hitler's plan of racial clarity also included Slavs, whose population he wanted to reduce by 30 million, and also Poles and other Slavic peoples such as Russians, Belarusians and Serbs, Bosnians, Roma & Sinti (also known as Gypsies), and some Africans, Asians and others who did not belong to the "Aryan race"; the mentally ill and the physically disabled; homosexuals; and political opponents and religious dissidents such as communists, trade unionists, Freemasons and Jehovah's Witnesses. When after the end of the war, the concentration camps were discovered, Churchill's words that "if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science" seemed like the bare truth. The death toll of the so called "Final Solution" was more than 6 million people, most of them Jews, killed "not in a fit of barbaric intoxication", but in a calculated, systematic, scientific way, and many were aware, if not actually witnessing. They were killed by hard labor, privation, epidemics, medical experiments, fusillade, bastinado or asphyxiation. And it was all part of a plan, to secure a vital place of living for the Aryan race (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Roberts, 2004).

Although no nation was involved in the war for moral reasons, the Second World War was proved to be a moral struggle, like no other great war has ever been. There was also a deep irony that highlighted the failure of a whole civilization, since these atrocities took in place in what was one of the more progressive countries in Europe, up until that point at least. The evil did not lie with one man only, but with a whole society. And this becomes even more obvious considering that the allied forces also moved in grey –to say the least- area. They did not bomb the access routes to concentration camps, or the gas chambers, even though there was such a possibility, without any reasonable excuse (other than maybe denial). The soviet army was responsible for many executions of Polish officers under the Nazi-Soviet pact, in the beginning of the war, and remained

notorious for the rapes and murders it committed on its way to Berlin (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999).

And the unanimous among the Allied leaders use of two nuclear bombs against Japan, that marked the end of the war and the lives of millions indiscriminately. The consequences of these bombs are still evident in Japanese people and still, the plane that carried the second bomb was blessed by a Roman Catholic priest. Maybe the real difference between an atom bomb and an ordinary bomb was not understood. Maybe greater leaders were needed. But that the use of not one but two atomic weapons against a country days away from surrendering remains inexplicable. After the bombs though it was painfully clear that nuclear fallout had abolished all frontiers and all sense of security (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Nye, 2005).

The process of racism requires a victimizer and a victim. The German people were in the role of the victimizer and the Jews and the rest of the unwanted sub-humans were in the role of the victim. There also were the roles of the silent witness and the unaware. These were not only limited in the German society, but also the Europeans (and the Church) that did not want to admit or to believe the crime committed. When it wasn't possible any more to remain silent or ignorant, the role of the savior and protector appeared. It was a primary process and a secondary intertwined. The primary process of the Allies was that they were representing the good side; the one that wanted freedom and democracy for all. Their secondary process though was the one of silence and denial; the one that couldn't face the truth; and the one that was partly accommodated by what was going on. Hitler obviously had not fully occupied the role of the evil one, the one without morality. And the Allies expressed it in their secondary process, and then unconsciously when they used the nuclear bomb, victimizing another people (Mindell, 1989, 1995).

Afterthoughts and aftereffects

The Second World War was different than any other war. Atrocities from all sides were tolerated, for the first time in such an extent there was mass bombing of civilians; there was an utter contempt of war rules such as fighting in certain days, women and children, ambassadors and clergy are not to be harmed, proportionate retaliation. The Holocaust, the sadistic treatment of war prisoners by the Japanese the use of atomic weapons seemingly without any consideration for the consequences present a picture of an era that inhumanity was not only tolerated but also accepted. After the war with the war trials there was an effort to reverse the feeling that ignoring the rules of war would remain unpunished. But, the cold truth remains that wars are started and conducted mostly on logistics and calculations (or miscalculations) of what is to be gained if the war is won. And the total war that the Second World War had posed some difficult and yet unanswered questions on human nature and its limits. Obviously, war cannot be eliminated, therefore it should be limited. And again, this statement is a rationalization, an acceptance of war merely as a fact of life, and not as a method of multiple homicides. Modern day wars are televised, and the horrifying images are common knowledge. Still, not even today, we have no proof, but only hope, that blatant awareness of the many could have stopped the death camps (Calvocoressi, Wint, & Pritchard, 1999. Nye, 2005).

The responsibility for war crimes haunted Germany long after. Some of the after effects of the Second World War were the partition of Germany and the subsequent alignment of Germany with Britain and France with France eventually becoming Germany's European partner. World politics changed and Europe was no longer able to stand without the United States being a political insider. The relation between Roosevelt and Churchill had lasting outcomes until today, the current relation between Britain and the United States and their almost total political agreement being an outstanding example. The birth of the EU could be considered to be a war child, whose parent nations hoped to bring peace and stability to a continent twice devastated from war in less than fifty years, and to eliminate the hatred that was lingering. And also the persecution of

Jews gave a new boost to Zionism, creating the explosive conflict in the Middle East (Howard, 2002b).

Germany after the world assumed the role of the guilty for along time, making it almost easy on everyone else to keep being the hero, the savior, the liberator. The trials of the war crimes served exactly this purpose. Again, the silent witness role was in the field. There was something extremely permissive in the field of the Second World War, something that justified all atrocities, something that rationalized all crimes. It was both roles, the one occupied by the Allies, and the one occupied by the German axis that were polarized, but their secondary processes were interrelated and they both shared the same edge of admitting weakness and limits. They remained polarized until the end of the war that one side eclipsed. Then the other side had to face its secondary process that was too similar with the enemy it had been fighting.

The end of the Second World War was the beginning of a new world process. The sub-group of winners had to share the globe, and this created a new conflict. Nazism stepped into the marginalized role (even today the Nazis' party is illegal in Germany), and it became a ghost role that only rarely appears in Europe or in the United States. The role of the Nazi is the one of superiority, and no morality; the one that doesn't believe in equality and same rights, the one that knows the truth. And, secondarily, the one that cannot accept their own weakness. The secondary process of the winners around the Jews initiated a conflict in Middle East that still goes on. The Second World War had finished, but the process was far from over. It acted as an umbrella that covered the entire globe, but left a lot to be expressed in the following decades. A symbolic resolution came with the creation of the European Union that embraced both the winners and losers, creating a role that would fit them both. However, the roles of the unfitting and the unwanted, the greedy and the self centered are still a reality in Europe, and in some ways they are the unprocessed inheritance of the Second World War (Mindell, 1995, 2002).

The Cold War

The background

At the turn of the century, analysts had already been predicting that the historic European world dominance was soon to be replaced by new world powers, which would most probably be continental sized states such as the United States and Russia and European nations that could sustain and exploit world empires. The end of the Second World War proved just that, eliminating Germany from the central role it possessed until then in international and European politics, and causing irreversible damage to whole of Europe (Roberts, 2004).

The Second World War in all its cruelty had also created the circumstances for what seemed to be an unholy alliance; countries and politicians identifying as being democratic stood side by side with a totalitarian regime such as Communism against another totalitarian regime that was Nazism. It is indicative of the mentality that democratic societies were reluctant at some extent to recognize the threat posed by Nazism, because of the fear of Communism. Furthermore, the first alliance of the Second World War was between Hitler and Stalin, a balance that would be overthrown later by the former's greed. When the Second World War ended, and with Nazism eliminated (at least for the time being), from this triangle of forces only two were left, and these two moved to opposing sides, creating the scene for another conflict. The two former allies would share the world, as Germany was shared. The war had ended and the whole world was the spoils (Freedman, 2002. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005)

And this would stand like that until the downfall of Communism. The champion for democracy was the United States, since Europe had to be rebuilt and had lost most of its power. The champion for Communism was the USSR. Two superpowers would dominate the political world scene for the next 50 years, as it was already predicted in the dawn of the 20th century. These two superpowers would never engage in a direct conflict with each other, which was the valued lesson of the use of atomic weapons. The axiom that ruled the Cold War was that any war that was likely to involve the use of nuclear weapons must not be started,

because it would infallibly lead to world destruction. Technology had advanced enough to allow each of the opponents to know exactly how strong the other one was; this had the advantage of reducing the fear of the unknown, but it built the fear of what was known in terms of weapons and its consequences (McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005. Nye, 2005).

The Cold War was a clear conflict between two roles that both claimed to represent the best for mankind. The United States and the USSR were more or less two sides of same coin; they had both fought against Nazism and racism and for freedom and equality. Clearly they had evolved in different roles, the United States representing the democratic role, whose power comes from the people, and the USSR being the one that protected and cared for the people, but they originated in the same sub-group. The black and white ideology still persisted in terms of clearly divided and defined roles, which shared the same dreaming for a better world. The ghost of the nuclear bomb would define this conflict as a cold one; all hot spots that could lead to an overt clash of powers would be side stepped, with all that this implied (Mindell, 1995; Goodbread, 1997).

The field

The power of the two adversaries was in different fields. The USSR had suffered immense casualties, but had gained control in central Europe; a series of satellite states and China with its communist regime seemed to be a definite ally. The United States on the other hand, had economical and political strength unlike any other, since the rest of the former world powers had managed at best to survive the war and was depending on the United States for financial support. The first act of the Cold War had already started with the end of the Second World War. Germany and its possible revival was the battleground once more and the partition was something that nobody had envisioned. It would soon prove to be prophetic for the fortune of the rest of the world. The price that Stalin had to pay for assuring the USSR power in Europe was that in the USSR the

conditions of living would not get better for at least a generation (McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005. Smith, 2005).

The destiny of Germany could be described as the first five minutes of a group process (or for that matter, the last five minutes of the previous one); the roles weren't clear in consensus reality, and Germany was already split in half, between the United States and the USSR influence. And of course, the rest of Europe had no role and no saying in this, at least overtly. The Berlin Wall wouldn't be built for another 15 years, but symbolically it was there from the first moment. In the isolationism of the United States –its primary process- was hiding a dominating world power. The edge was to acknowledge it.

While Stalin was introducing spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, the first time the United States broke its isolationism was when it substituted British influence on Greece. After the Second World War and the German occupation had ended, Greece was torn between the resistance army that was not a communist army, but the Greek Communist Party had readily (and after the victory) embraced it, and the rest of the people. Stalin had already exchanged influence in Greece with a free hand in Romania, and soon the British army came to help restrain what seemed to become a communist revolution. However, Britain was in no economical position to support troops in Greece, so the United States took its place, both with armed forces and with economical support. It was the first time that the United States actively offered help to a country to resist “outside pressures”, and to contain Soviet power. This containment of Soviet power would dictate the United States politics for a long time to come, and it was encouraged by the French and the British. It is ironic that the role of the United States as the European (and subsequently world) safe keeper was supported by the former world rulers. The beginning of the Cold War was sealed when western European countries formed an Organization for European Economic Cooperation to handle the United States help (aka Marshall Plan), and the USSR replied with forming Comecon, a Council for mutual economic assistance that involved the satellite states and was the first step for Soviet interference in their economic policies. Of course, after the Second World War another international entity had

come to life, one that was embracing the United States and the USSR, the United Nations Organization. But since both the United States and the USSR were permanent members that could veto any decision, the new found organization was unable to act as an elder, or even as a referee (Freedman, 2002. Patterson, 2002. Roberts, 2004. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005).

The United States went over its edge, abandoned isolationism and resumed its status as a international power; it was even forced to by Britain's inability to stay in the role. For the USSR on the other hand, it was easier. The myth of Communism was to unite all the workers of the world against the capital, so it implied from the beginning an internationalism that the United States was denying. The financial aid also put the United States in the role of the affluent supporter, and it gave a serious saying in the internal affairs. The United Nations Organization was created as an elder, but it was haunted by the inheritance of the League of Nations. An elder seizes to have any rank if they can be vetoed; furthermore, the United Nations couldn't even stand for democracy (let alone deep democracy), since the very myth of its creation allowed for some voices to be louder. For all its drawbacks, the United Nations still was the expression of a high dream of democracy and peace.

Instead of the United Nations, two new organizations embodied the spirit of the era. The first was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that represented the commitment of the United States to the security and the stability of Western Europe. The safety of Western Europeans directly involved now the United States, and the notion of the West had just been invented. The United States had included in its diplomacy and funding all of the Western Europe. The USSR responded with the Warsaw Pact that included the Central European countries under its influence. Europe became the first truly divided region between the two systems, with few technically (but not emotionally) neutral states (Kinder & Hingelmann, 2003. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005).

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact brought up the ghost role of the military protection. They were created to prevent another war, being thus dualistic in nature. To assure peace, they were preparing for war.

The United States government did nothing more than pursue the aims it had set before and for the war: the protection of justice and democracy. Also, most of the Americans –the soldiers excluded, of course- remained safe at home, in a country that had experienced nothing of the actual war, as Europe did. This allowed the United States to be in a financially better place than European countries, with resources and materials still available. And the United States was the only country that started the after war era with excellent military equipment, among which also was the nuclear bomb, a weapon that no other country had –or expected to have for many years. But American predominance was both a fact and a myth, since their most dangerous weapon was the one that they were most reluctant to use. So, the United States wouldn't yet become an omnipotent power, but one that could be matched by the USSR (and this remained true, since the USSR would also possess nuclear weapons soon after the end of the Second World War, in August 1949). On the other hand, the Soviet regime had suffered terribly during the Second World War, and now it appeared to be the true progressive ideology that preached the social justice that Nazism (and liberal capitalism) was threatening (Patterson, 2002. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005).

The myth of international domination behind the Cold War was eloquently stated by Truman when he was still a senator; when Hitler invaded Russia, he said that Americans should help the Russian for as long as they were losing the war. When they started winning, the Americans should help the Germans, so that each side would have the most casualties. This cynical realization predicted-successfully- that the United States-USSR alliance would not survive the end of War. And unfortunately, it justified the suspiciousness that the USSR started exhibiting towards the United States right after the end of the war; in dreamland the USSR was right. In a sense, the Second World War only postponed the conflict between the United States and the USSR, and the

ideologies the two countries were standing for, and after it ended, the conflict was resumed. And suddenly, the prospect of a third world war seemed possible. The umbrella of the Second World War had not covered all that had come up, as was the conflict between democracy and Communism. It was the residue that the Cold War came to process. In another sense, the Second World War acted like a terrorist that took charge of the process. After the resolution, the hot spots that had created would have to be resolved (Mindell, 1995, 2002; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

After the USSR had successfully built its own atomic bomb, an era of armament competition began, one with no definitive winner. Each country was devoted to military excellence to ensure a new period of peace. And this peace was nothing more than “the sturdy child of terror” to use Churchill’s words, since it was a peace almost blackmailed by the horror of nuclear weapons. The Cold War could be paralleled to a poker game: it was all about the bluff, and not the certainty, that one would be able to withstand a first strike and then to retaliate, if they didn’t manage to strike first and leave the adversary impotent. By the mid-60’s, both countries had succeeded in having such military equipment that would assure mutual destruction in case of a war. They had managed to acquire a balance of terror, and that feeling was spread in the citizens, that one mistake could lead to Armageddon. The mere thoughts of the consequences were enough to induce much caution in decision making of both countries. They both followed a policy of mutual restraint, and they were committed not to be the first to use a nuclear weapon. This situation lasted for 35 years (Roberts, 2004. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005).

The nuclear arms race led both superpowers to acquire a surplus of military technology, much greater than what was needed for the small scale conventional wars they pursued. Nuclear deterrence was just another element that helped the stabilization of the conflict. Both spheres of influence had become by the mid 50’s strong enough to guarantee peaceful coexistence. However, far from nuclear power, there still were political and ideological differences that mobilized the people. With Stalin’s death many of the crimes of the communist regime came

into light and furthermore the conditions of living in the USSR and the satellite countries were still inferior to those of the West. The Berlin Wall was built overnight to stop the massive exit of Soviet citizens to the West and became the practical manifestation of the Iron Curtain that was dividing the world. The status quo was set and nobody wanted to disrupt it. The only time that the world came close to a nuclear war was the Soviet installment of missiles in Cuba in 1962. This is partly why there was no western interference during the Prague Spring of 1968, a revolution against the communist regime that was settled (in a not so peaceful way) in the boundaries of the USSR. The reason for that sustenance of the existing status quo was the so called Third World, the part of the world that was neither communist, nor capitalist, since it was these countries that both the United States and the USSR were more interested in adding to their spheres of influence. Countries that already belonged to their satellite, were treated as a given (Freedman, 2002. Smith, 2005).

A conflict that lasts for 35 years (and even then it is not really resolved) could be the very definition of an intractable conflict. Edges were maintained and hot spots were missed. The roles were recycling. And the entry of the Third World as a third party that both roles were trying to attract did nothing more than create satellite conflicts, as the two superpowers were creating satellite countries. An interesting point here is that the missile crisis in Cuba was resolved with the personal communication of Kennedy and Khrushchev. After this event, a direct line of communication between the White House and the Kremlin was set, in order to prevent another incident like that. It seems that this alone proves how relationship could help resolve a conflict like that. And still, Kennedy's assassination in the next year left little to be hoped for in the future. Maybe the Kairos (the spirit of the time) wasn't right yet.

The Third World countries were in a strange way the regulators, since both superpowers were trying to establish their influence on them. And on their turn, these countries saw opportunities rising from aligning with one of the two superpowers. As most of the Third World countries were new countries that had come from the debris of colonialism, they also were much more unstable than

European countries, and therefore conflicts were much more dangerous. An outstanding example was the Vietnam War that led the American politics in the corner. The result was that after the Vietnam War (and the open wound it left on the American society for many decades), the United States was only to provide logistical support to those that wanted to fight Communism. A new military isolationism had come to stay for more than 35 years. (An interesting point here: the first official implication of the United States troops in a war after Vietnam was in the Gulf War of 1991, and after the official end of the Cold War. It seems that the entry in a new era of international politics demands the sacrifice of human lives, at least until a new status quo is assured.) Of course, it is always possible that if Kennedy had remained in office –and alive for that matter– American involvement in Vietnam would have ended much sooner and with less casualties than 1973, but it is also possible that this resolution would be premature (Freedman, 2002. Smith, 2005).

The Vietnam War was under the umbrella of the Cold War and it allowed for the ghost role of military intervention to be expressed. The USSR's Vietnam War was the Afghanistan invasion in 1979. The Cold War adversaries were following parallel tracks, failing to learn from each other's mistakes. They were both stuck in a double edge that stopped them from engaging in a direct conflict and did not allow for differentiation (Goodbread, 1997; Diamond & Jones, 2005).

What ended the Cold War was de-escalation by the USSR at a period that the United States had been rapidly and heatedly escalating. The reason for that was – once again- the economy. In 1985, the new General Secretary of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev in an attempt to save a faltering economy and modernize the Soviet system needed first to appease the East –West relations. Gorbachev was the first to speak publicly and honestly for the need of political reform in order for economical reform to be successful. The words that he used became the slogans of an era: *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (reconstruction). He moved to an impressive cutting back of Soviet military strength that took aback the United States and British governments. The Gorbachev *glasnost* eventually

led to the downfall of Communism, as it unveiled the incompetence of the Communist Party to remain true to the idea of social justice and equality. A new era was beginning, with the demolition of the Berlin Wall. Soon however, the rejoicing for the new freedom would be despair in the face of intractable national conflicts in what used to be Yugoslavia which made the Cold War era to seem as the calmest and stable in the Europe's 20th century history. For the next period the former USSR would become 15 new states trying to stand on their feet and the United States would establish its role on the globe as the only superpower (Brown, 2002. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005).

The downfall of the Communism in the USSR was inevitable. Or, to be exact, it was the only way to end the Cold War without an actual conflict. The USSR had an important disadvantage compared to the United States. It was a totalitarian regime that for almost 50 years did not allow the different voices to be heard. The "revolution" that overturned it was not a popular revolution, but a governmental. The people followed the flow, as they had been doing. Gorbachev stepped in the role of the innovator, in large part because of his personality, and also because the timing was right. He alone expressed all the different voices that were silent, and picked up the other side, the United States' capitalism and individuality. The myth of the country wouldn't allow for anything else to happen, that is other than a strong leader leading the country in a new era. Although Communism was all about popular power, the fact that it was Russia at first that embraced it is ironic. Russia had always been ruled in an autocratic way, and this autocracy was the ghost role that was never processed, and in result, it became the USSR's secondary process.

The United States during the Cold War

The years until the 60's found the United States society in an unprecedented economical and political well being. It was incomparably the richest and the most powerful nation and also breaking new ground where human rights were concerned. If there was a dream after the defeat of Nazism, the United States was

making it true. However, the civil rights movement (and the Vietnam War) would shake the American society in its roots. The true American dream was about opportunity and the equality of opportunity for all social groups; the various underprivileged groups though demanded equality of condition. Not so suddenly, the divisions of race, gender, class did not seem as easy to overcome. But the greatest blow on the American political system was the economy. The economical progress of the first two decades after the Second World War was followed by double digit unemployment and inflation rate in the 1970's and the 1980's. This economical recession also had repercussions in the social and racial tensions, since it affected mostly the already underprivileged. Although, this economical recession would be overcome, and the civil rights movement would keep and in some instances increase its winnings, the American optimism would never reach its previous height (Patterson, 2002. Nye, 2005).

Even in the years of affluence, American society was deeply divided by poverty and racial issues. Furthermore, the battle against Communism was taking its toll in the country's inside politics too, where the Left was considerably weaker than in many other nations. A post Second World War Red Scare in the United States that put liberals in the defensive characterized the rise of the Cold War in international politics. While the United States was campaigning for freedom and democracy outside the borders, inside a true revolution was starting to happen, with the Blacks starting to demand civil rights, the women to claim their professional space and an irreverent youth culture to express itself with rock music and denial of materialism. The civil rights movement in the United States that affected the lives of thousands was the single most important domestic process, and from the mid 60's it wasn't peaceful, and soon the different groups protesting for social equality would turn on each other. The years of the Cold War and the American civil rights movement were marked by three assassinations; of President Kennedy, of Reverend Martin Luther King and of presidential candidate Robert Kennedy. This social upheaval put the conservative current in the United States on the offensive, and it resulted with the election of President Reagan who promised to be even tougher against the Communists. The Cold War

was fueled by the inequalities in the American society and the continuous reluctance of political leaders to deal with them (Patterson, 2002).

The United States internal process in the years of the Cold War is the secondary process of its foreign policy. All the conflict that remained tacit in relation with the USSR was expressed in the civil rights movement. The United States were championing democracy and freedom from Communism, and at the same time marginalized groups within its borders were fighting for equality in civil rights. This is an irony, and also it is the reason that allowed the United States to be the country of the brave and the land of the free. Just because opposition was allowed on its soil, the country was actively standing for democracy. The results of the civil rights movement were not the optimal, since they only happened on a systemic, and not on the relationship or the individual level too; as a result, change was not as excessive as was hoped for. Still, it set the bar for the rest of the world to reach. At the same time, the assassinations of the mythical figures that were (or would become) J.F. Kennedy, M.L. King and R.F. Kennedy, who stood for freedom and the dream of a better and more just world for all, were the outcome of the ghost role of hatred that wasn't allowed in the United States. And they created another myth, that of a better world that could have existed. It became fuel in the mythical influence that the United States still hold over the rest of the world. The role of the assassin of such bigger than life figures in each case couldn't be filled just by one man; the collective unconscious never accepted this version as the truth, that in each case the assassin was just one man. But the role of the assassin was finally and undoubtedly expressed, even if it was just in the sub-group that was the United States. The opposing roles in the interior of the United States were the progressive and the conservative, something that still remains in its political system. The progressive is mostly about equal opportunities and social justice for all, while the conservative favors individualism and economic growth. They were and are the expressions of the

same roles that still exist in the international political scene, and it is yet one more intractable conflict.

The USSR during the Cold War

The victory in the Second World War made it easy for Stalin to establish a dictatorship and at the same time for the people to believe that they were living in a far more just society than any to be found in the Western world. Strict censorship and a manipulation of the patriotic feeling made it easy for the insulation of the USSR from the outside world to be preserved. The equality that Communism was preaching for was not part of the governance since the Communist Party leader (Secretary General) commanded more power than anyone else (Brown, 2002. Nye, 2005).

The first blow on the Communist regime was given from inside in the mid 1950's when it was revealed that Stalin had been a cruel dictator, guilty of millions of deaths. This revelation came from Stalin's successor Nikita Khrushchev and caused, in the beginning, the disillusionment and then the formation of dissenting movements. This expose shattered forever the myth of infallibility that the Communist Party had enjoyed. Khrushchev was the only leader of the USSR that was at the same time a true believer in the founding ideas of Communism and a pragmatist that listened to the people. The vast building project he commenced allowed for greater privacy and, as a result, greater freedom of speech, at least privately (Brown, 2002. Nye, 2005).

The dual nature (primary and secondary process) of Communism is evident from the beginning. On one hand, it is all about unprivileged people (the myth of its creation). And on the other, it exhibits a totalitarian façade opposite to the people's will (secondary process). Its paternalistic dreaming is also apparent in the way that the people talked about the "Father" Stalin and the "Mother" Russia. It was all about the people, but the power and the government did not derive from the people. A ghost role of popular will and self determination would always haunt the USSR. And at the same time, the

way that the truth about Stalin was said, is exemplary of the way that the USSR functioned. All started from the head of the state.

During the Cold War, the Soviet economy was nowhere near that of the United States, however, the leadership of the USSR cultivated an image of outperforming the West. This illusion was mostly built on the consecutive successes of the “space conquest” with the first satellite in orbit and the first human in space being Soviet. The United States, of course, would strike back putting the first man on the moon. It was a period that Earth did not seem enough of a battleground, while space provided endless possibilities. Khruchev’s rule was most humane than Stalin’s but was only appreciated after the *perestroika* that allowed for the publishing of documents. In the political changes that preceded and followed Khruchev, the Soviet people remained apathetic, considering themselves as unable to be of influence (Brown, 2002. Roberts, 2004. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005).

That alone constitutes the greatest difference between the United States and the USSR. At that same period, people at the United States were actively pursuing their rights, or at least demanded them, thinking that they could change the world; in the USSR people felt powerless to change or even influence their leaders. The USSR and the United States were in parallel roles, but the people of each country followed an entirely different process, and were in entirely different roles. This created the background for the creation of the myth of the Cold War, that it was (this war too) about the freedom of the people. The other mythical aspect of the Cold War was the battle for space. And in this aspect the Cold War enforced man’s feeling of omnipotence, continuing the process that had begun even before the French Revolution. The space had the additional advantage of being too far away and therefore safe. In dreamland, the superpower that would be successful in conquering the space would also be the winner of the conflict. Space was the hugest yet third party to be used in a conflict.

Space stood for the ultimate proof of power, the most difficult –and most precious- conquest. Whoever was able to control the stars would become god, in a way. And, at the same time, this struggle for the domination of space pushed human limits to their extremes, in terms of physical, intellectual and emotional ability. Man was once again becoming his own god, and the possibilities were infinite. And that was the common essence between the two parties, their need to exceed what until then was thought as human limits, and reach for the godly.

Khruchev's successor was Brezhnev, who stopped the criticism towards the Stalin era, fearing that this criticism was actually undermining the Party's authority. Dissidents were forced in exile, but in general what Brezhnev did was to clearly state the rules. The result was that most of the people experienced that period as a stable and a predictable one. Furthermore, people were starting to gradually change and to feel greater freedom to express their dissent, but only privately. In the years until Gorbachev's rise however, the disagreement was rising, but it would only be expressed when the circumstances would allow it (Brown, 2002).

Brezhnev obviously realized the utility of meta-communication. By explaining the rules, all the fear of the unknown vanished, and the people felt more in control of their destiny.

Brezhnev may have enforced political stability did not cope with the fundamental problems of economic growth, deterioration of health and mortality rates, environmental pollution, or corruption. His successors both died in office in a space of two and a half years. The next and final Secretary General of the USSR was Gorbachev, who, when elected, was not even suspected to be a reformer. Gorbachev was the one that gradually introduced freedom of speech in the Soviet society. This liberty to criticize became the tombstone of the Communist regime, as it gave all the people that had taken it for granted and remained silent the opportunity to turn against it. *Perestroika* might be the only revolution that started from the head of the government, but it quickly became popular. The breaking up of the USSR was not planned, but it was the result of the sudden

ascendance of nationalism that followed the decline of Communism. Gorbachev had managed to introduce in the USSR the freedom of speech, publication, and religion, to hold elections, and to procure new laws that would allow autonomous political organization. By the time that the red Communist flag lowered from the Kremlin in December 25 1991, the Communist regime had already collapsed (Brown, 2002. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005).

Gorbachev saw the end of the Cold War, after he had changed the Soviet behavior towards the satellite countries, proclaiming and practically allowing their right to elect their leaders and to manage their economy. As Russia and a number of other national states had emerged from what used to be the USSR, and were trying to deal with the new political and economical reality, the United States found itself without an adversary. The Cold War had ended, and the world was trying again to find a new balance (Roberts, 2004).

Gorbachev incorporated all the secondary process of Communism. He became the one to grant freedom back to the people and he dared to cause another revolution. At the same time, the people of the USSR were again a ghost role. They were not asked, they did not take part in the decision making process. In contrast, the people of the United States were very much present, and strongly identified with their leaders. And the resolution of the Cold War was a cool spot; the whole world was in awe watching an empire crumble to its feet, not by its stated opponent, but from within. It was the internal process of the USSR that ended the Cold War conflict, and not a resolution of the conflict itself.

Conclusions

This paper set out to roughly map a previously uncharted area: that of past international conflicts and their Process Work analysis. In the course of writing, it became obvious that the Process Work tools that apply to group processes can also be implemented in the breakdown of historical events and in the forecast of their route. It showed that history is nothing more than a path of interrelated events. Unprocessed ghost roles reoccur and unresolved conflicts recycle, until all parts are expressed and resolution is reached. Time, of course, gives the luxury of not having to decide what is more important in any given moment; history has already been written more than once, the events have been laid down and only the connections must be found. However, if this lucidness can be maintained in the current events, the ability to discern the roles and the ghost roles, the primary and secondary processes, to reflect on the myths that motivate the reactions, then Process Work provides a compass for understanding a world that is gradually becoming a labyrinth of international relations and interconnected conflicts. The next step of this project could be a deeper analysis of these and other historical conflicts; also, it would be valuable to create a current map of conflict analysis that can lead to interventions in different parts of the world.

Concluding this paper, there were two roles that appeared in every single conflict (not only the ones described here): the nation and the economy. The nation was what held the pot for the French Revolution to occur; in the name of national survival and integrity the Second World War started; and two multicultural nations were the carriers of the Cold War. At the same time, the French Revolution, the Second World War, and the Cold War were either initiated or concluded or both because of financial matters and the power of the economy. The role of the affluent was always present, as was the role of the one that needs and demands for more. There is a fine line between needing and greed and this line isn't always clear in large scale conflicts. But it is always crystal clear in personal relationships. The one major hot spot that

could lead to nuclear war was avoided because of personal relationship between two leaders of opposing states. This alone is the perfect example of the course of a group process: from group to relationship and the self. All these conflicts were group conflicts and all included charismatic personalities. When the element of the personal relationship was present, the conflict was avoided, alliances were built.

The world after the Cold War is still under construction. The first signs are those of an unresolved conflict that recycles. The “Evil Empire” as the USSR was known collapsed, but the world and its only remaining superpower needed another opponent to complete the process. This opponent appeared in the Islamic terrorist groups. A new war has been declared, again a war against evil. Every conflict in the beginning has a manichaistic element; there is good and evil. But at the end the boundaries between the two blend, the roles appear to be more similar than different. In the current war against terror, both sides seem equally frightening. But a superpower can't stand without an opponent against whom it will prove its power. The mere role of the superpower implies the one that is overpowered. The next big conflict will most probably not be Eurocentric or even part of the Western world. Asia, Oceania and Africa are the continents that have been in the background (or third parties) for too long. Deep democracy is all about creating the space and listening to all the voices, but it is also a necessity and a natural law: at some point all the voices will be heard, all the roles will be expressed, all the processes will happen. Politics and politicians (and the politician inside) have an infallible way to create and then to ignore hot spots. And hot spots have their own way of coming back. In the Constitution of the French Revolution slavery was ignored; during the Second World War, the implied conflict of the United States and the USSR was buried; in the Cold War the victimizing of Third World countries disregarded. All these ghost roles were due to reappear. To predict what will happen next seems almost impossible. The first 5 minutes of the current process are again all about economy and another

battle of good and evil; the field has moved to the Middle East. But there are also other roles that slowly appear: China as a new kind of power is reestablishing its place in the world; Europe is trying to find its place in the world with gradually less support from the United States; and the new role of the internet, the one that holds all the knowledge without the wisdom to discern right from wrong is also here, giving power and potential freedom of expression to all sides (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994. Deutch & Coleman, 2000. Howard & Louis, 2002. Chomsky, 2003. Roberts, 2004. McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2005). If I wanted to risk a prediction (or rather to express a wishful thinking), it is that the era of nations as we have known them is coming to an end. The Cold War was between two multicultural nations. Almost all of the countries that were (re)created after the fall of the USSR have applied to become members of the European Union (nationalism still is a primary process, but being part of something even bigger is most secondary). The world has grown too small to sustain the idea of a big nation. Maybe this will be the time for individuals and their personal relationships to initiate the change. Or may be not.

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